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A Prelude: Terra’s Predicament 
Once upon a time there was a planet – perfect green and egg-shell blue.  It hung, 
fragile and ancient, in the yawning firmament of space-time. On the planet-surface – 
a thin crust riding a molten sea –one species outreached all others, reaching for the 
vaulted heavens with an inventiveness that far outstripped its own moral insight.  It 
took a river of time and thought – but after a slow start the inventiveness of the 
Terrans built to an accelerating howl driven by a complex current of exchanges and 
interplays too vast to trace.   
 
Now, the seething world of Terra has reached a crisis point threatening the very 
materiality of life itself. The planet teeters at the tipping point.   
 
The restless Terra-North need for expansion has emptied out civilisations, 
constructing in their place vast edifices of thought and speech, action and endless 
taking – until the rest of planetary life succumbed to the shadow-threat in which the 
„terminus‟ now lurks, for Terran chemicals have leached into the very fluids of the 
planetary body, crushing the great terrestrial lung and engorging its ventricles with 
the toxins that now seize every rhizomatic finger of Terra‟s sprawling vegetation.  
  
Against the gathering gloom of smoke-smeared skies, giants open sonorous, flashing 
throats to swallow the world whole. These creations of Terra-North, once servants – 
now masters – and possessing characteristics that no Terran ultimately can – leap 
across Terra in the flicker of a sleepless eyelid, dismembering time and space, 
dominating everything that they are not. The „great unsleeping eye‟, the ocular rulers 
of multiple spheres, the giants expand, crowned in neon, while in their shadows, the 
least powerful Terrans dissolve. Terra, her biotic mysteries torn into mathematical 
shards, her warm inaudible throb buried beneath ceaseless chattering media, lies 
ravaged, while the giants appear and disappear, assuming and discarding materiality 
at will. They slip instantaneously across boundaries and borders, exploiting porosity, 
but they divide Terra with impenetrable walls through which no breathing thing can 
pass.   
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This imaginary scene is offered by the author as a way of trying to paint a linguistic image of 
some of the key themes invoked by the reflections herein. Key among these themes are 
certain closures of liberal legal ideology, ones often criticised by scholars suspicious of the 
ideological foundations of law‟s traditional commitment to capitalist values, structures and 
power. The themes of property, capitalism and liberal legal ideology imply powerful links 
between the broad analysis offered here, and, for example, Norrie‟s famous analysis of the 
ideological (and historically instantiated) structure of criminal law (in Crime, Reason and 
History – cited below).   
 
One ‘Critical Map’ of the Global Present 
We live – it seems – in dangerous times. Our planet (and we who inhabit it) face 
unprecedented threats in the form of climate change, environmental degradation, the 
eradication of entire species of flora and fauna, looming sets of interlinked eco-system crises 
and a growing sense that the ravages visited upon the delicate balance of our world could 
even, at this point, be irreversible. Meanwhile, in social terms, we witness a burgeoning and 
unprecedented global rift between rich and poor accompanied by a rapid and seemingly 
relentless deepening of human vulnerability on a whole set of measures, and linked by 
scholars to the dynamics of neo-liberal globalisation.2 Indeed, it has been pointed out that 
globalisation and its patterns of impoverishment and structural injustice3 closely mirrors the 
differential impacts of climate change4 – for it is the poorest societies, groups and individuals 
who most lack the capacity and/or resilience to respond and adapt.5 At the same time, these 
patterns are linked, through the theme of globalisation again, to the ascendancy of global 
corporate power6 – itself implicated in many a human rights abuse and environmental 
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disaster.7 Arguably, we can and should now place the growing vulnerability of human and 
animal populations, and of the living systems that support them, in direct relationship to the 
relatively hegemonic ideological closure currently dominating the world order – if not always 
in straightforwardly causal terms (though there are reasons enough to link deepening 
vulnerability and globalisation as a causal matter8) then as a deliberate political choice. 
 
There is an urgent need to challenge the current confluence between global corporate 
interests and what we can think of as a widespread state capitulation. Global corporate 
power (or what some have termed in broader terms as the „corporate takeover‟9 of 
contemporary life) is not convincingly resisted by most states. In fact, many states actively 
court transnational corporations and their interests, pursuing neo-liberalism as the ideology 
of choice.10 For states attempting to resist the strictures of neo-liberalism, the strategic 
power to refuse investment operates as a crucial mechanism in an oppressive „politics of 
side effect‟11 producing forms of domination12 which, on analysis, suggest that the political 
meta-power of global capital is an insidious but decisive shift in the nature of power itself.13 
State compliance/complicity is effectively mandated – especially for the poorest nations on 
earth:14 International organisations such as the World Trade Organisation and the World 
Bank, the „midwives‟15 of the globalised neo-liberal order, force conditionality packages upon 
cash-strapped developing nations, ensuring their conformity, no matter how reluctant, to the 
imperatives of neo-liberal capitalism.16   
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The concept of national state sovereignty stands weakened, but in a highly selective way 
that disadvantages the powerless most of all.17 Nation states have effectively been re-
constituted as profoundly porous to global capital (open-bordered good „host states‟)18 – 
while, at the very same time, the discursive construction of anti-terror imperatives and the 
permanent „state of exception‟19 in which we now live ensures that the „hard edges‟ of state 
power are felt with intensifying force by a state‟s own human population. The same can be 
said of all those vulnerable non-citizens whose living, opaque and tangible bodies (in all their 
vulnerability) press up against the policed and exclusory borders of the modern state. A 
series of further, related trends seem to converge in a stifling closure: Surveillance, the 
spreading privatisation and increasingly privatised control of public space20 – the 
construction, in short, of a virtual Panopticon reflecting a combination of state and (frequently 
corporate) privatised oversight of civic space; the deepening corporatisation of the state 
itself; the commodification of the social spheres,21 these combine to produce a radical 
contraction of public space, a contradiction of civil liberties and a concomitant reduction in 
our ability to resist. Meanwhile, law (as the institutionally dominant mechanism for the 
regulation of societal life) provides an arterial mechanism through which the ideological flow 
driving these and related closures find expression in a host of organisational structurations 
and patterns offering little in the form of either resistance or critique.22  
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At the same time, however, the global ascendancy of legal-rights-discourse means that 
many voices speaking as and for the excluded and subaltern now turn to law, legal rights 
and the legal process as part of an attempt to address injustice and exclusion. One 
particularly relevant example of this, for the purpose of the present reflection, is the growing 
contemporary concern for the expansion of legal subjectivity. We witness, for example, 
increasing calls for the recognition of the potential legal subjectivity of animals,23 the 
environment and elements within it,24 while at the same time we encounter growing interest 
in the legal subjectivity of post-human entities such as artificial intelligences or agents, 
robots and the like.25 This debate is, of course, vitally important. However, if it is to lead to 
any form of justice worthy of the name, reflection needs to be placed against the contextual 
backdrop of hegemonic globalisation – for it is when we place the extension of legal 
subjectivity against this that we can identify one particular future challenge of central 
importance. There is a need to face up to the challenge of „minding the gap‟ (likely to 
deepen) between laws „outsiders‟ (those currently excluded from the interiority of neo-liberal 
privilege) and law‟s „insiders‟ (those whose interests and even whose legal subjectivity 
emerges from) their virtually seamless fit with the deep commitments that currently constitute 
the interior of neo-liberal capitalistic techno-culture. 
 
Identifying/Constructing ‘the gap’ 
It can be argued, of course, that all categories and „gaps‟ are, in the final analysis, a choice 
of closure – a way of demarcating, more or less – choices about the perception/construction 
of „monads‟ within an otherwise undifferentiated field.26 It is important, however, while 
acknowledging this and other valuable insights of post-modernism and post-humanism,27 to 
stress the urgency of developing a political consciousness responsive to the vulnerability of 
embodied life, bio-vitality and materiality – allowing this to form the basis of a material 
„excess‟ as a means of delivering critique to the current closures of law and capitalism. We 
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need, it is suggested, to find a way of developing a jurisprudence and politics of compassion 
fully responsive to the lived realities of immiseration, exclusion and exploitation – and to their 
ethical demand. One part of this important task could be the placing of debates and 
philosophical puzzles concerning the extension of legal subjectivity within the overarching 
socio-material context of hegemonic globalisation and corporate social dominance.   
 
It should be noted, related to this, and perhaps as an element of such an approach, that 
legal subjectivity, as currently constituted, has a distinctive ideological tilt – one ill-suited to 
the protection of animals and complex eco-systemic concerns28 but ideally suited to the 
juridical advantage of the corporate form.29 Given the effective domination of the world order 
by corporations to the proven detriment of humans, animals and environment alike, it seems 
most important when theorising legal subjectivity to be alert to any continuities with the 
(effective) nacropolitics of law‟s existing inclusions and exclusions, patterns that could map 
themselves almost seamlessly into new formulations of legal subjectivity. While it is clear, in 
relation to this point, that excluded human beings, animals and ecosystems are especially 
vulnerable and in need of legal protection from the excesses of globalised capitalism and its 
side-effects,30 it is likely to be the case, also, that post-human entities such as artificial 
intelligences and robots can and will be conceived of as vulnerable. But while we should 
note, as a conceptual matter, that vulnerability itself is not a monolithic value and nor are 
entities monolithic in their „identity‟/‟identification‟ for the purpose of describing them as 
vulnerable or worthy of an ethical concern responsive to vulnerability, there remains, 
arguably, a vital political need to construct a critical fault-line attending putative post-human 
rights-claimants, in particular.   
 
This fault line, in line with the argument already made, is intended to reflect an ethically and 
politically important distinction between liberal law/capitalism‟s „insiders‟ (those with 
unhampered access to both the legal process and to a strong degree of „fit‟ with the 
ideological structure of liberal law – a category including – quintessentially – the corporation) 
and those people and collectivities who are, along with animals and the environment, liberal 
law/capitalism‟s „outsiders‟ – and likely to remain so even if and when animals, the 
environment and post-human entities are granted legal subjectivity.  Historically, and 
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contemporaneously, law‟s outsiders, according to a range of critical accounts, are the (some 
would doubtless want to say „predictable‟) historical (and contemporary) recipients of 
discursive and physical violence – those who disproportionately bear the costs of a 
capitalistic techno-rationality: the global poor, women, children, other non-dominant humans 
– such as racially non-dominant groups and the disabled –along with animals, sensitive eco-
system habitats and the environment as a whole.31 This group of „outsider‟ subjectivities/(and 
‟objects‟) have long provided the plundered, exploited „bodies‟ in the service of capitalist 
appropriation – and also often – the „bodies in the way‟ of capital. Haunting and instructive 
examples, such as Bhopal,32 stand as mournful case-studies – highly revealing symbols of 
the worst of the fallout from „toxic capitalism‟33 – and equally symbolic of the juridical failure34 
that deepens capitalist injustice, rather than alleviating it.  
 
When we start to reflect upon legal subjectivity and the case for its expansion, keeping a 
vivid focus upon the background of globalisation and the tragedies littering the history of the 
relationship between law and capital, is essential – for it is highly likely that many post-
human and/or techno-entities will share the advantages of the corporate domination and 
marketisation of the social spheres as „insiders‟ to the capitalistic techno-economy. This 
point, however, should not be monolithically read, for it is feasible to anticipate that some 
post-human beings will, as the „products‟ of capitalist investment, be placed in a highly 
double-edged position, one requiring a critical ethical attentiveness.35 Notwithstanding this 
possibility and its implications, it is a virtual certainty that the inconvenient and traditionally 
excluded subjectivities (objectified people, animals and natural systems) linked to traditional 
and contemporaneous injustices of the capitalist juridical order will retain, no matter how 
complexly, a quintessentially „outsider‟ status (that is, unless the entire world-order moves 
from its existing ideological foundations). This virtual guarantee of continuing and perhaps 
even deepening outsider status is a matter that ought to be placed front and centre of 
reflection upon the extension of legal subjectivity to post-human entities – not in order to 
render extending legal subjectivity inherently problematic, but in order to render problematic 
the current reality of capitalistic law‟s dark fallout in that context.   
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Complexities, of course, abound. The rapidity and complexity of technological change 
necessitates a corresponding fluidity or responsiveness in theorisation, for a start. 
Additionally, there will always contradictory realities in play: there will, for example, always 
be individuals (even groups) who break free of existing patterns of structural injustice, which 
while it is a welcome development, can present problems for the general observations about 
injustice and the related languages of identification („women‟, „blacks‟, „the poor‟) – 
languages and generalisations remaining decisively important to those still locked in 
structural disadvantage. Furthermore, the implications of future developments in technology 
are likely to be extremely complex. Yet, notwithstanding these present and future 
complexities, and a host of other imaginable (and unimagined) subtleties, it seems vital, as a 
political matter, to point out that there are, historically, now, and in the likely or foreseeable 
future, human beings (and animals and natural systems) that remain and are likely to remain 
constituted as profoundly ‘outsider’ in real terms.   
 
Final Thoughts: a Politics of Compassion? 
Returning, then, to the concern haunting this reflection, it seems highly likely that present 
and future dominant groups („insiders‟ – including future „insider subjectivities‟ emerging from 
the heart of the capitalist techno-economy) will (continue to) possess privileges intimately 
related to the rising power of the corporate entities and priorities currently shaping the worst 
excesses of globalisation and its fallout. Meanwhile, it is likely that the yawning gap between 
the powerful and powerless will continue to grow in its significance and intractability. In this 
light, placing legal debates concerning rights-subjectivity against the larger backdrop of 
contemporary globalisation and the related excesses (historical and contemporaneous) of 
the intimacy between law and capital is an important political task. A politics of compassion – 
even as it is conducive to the extension of law‟s circle of concern beyond the human – must 
necessarily reach beyond the closures of law to respond to the tortured realities of the 
differential material and discursive subject-positions (including human subject-positions) 
generated by a burgeoning capitalistic techno-economy. A politics of compassion has 
arguably never been more urgent. As we open our minds to the important idea of the 
subjectivity of a range of putative new rights-claimants – it is essential that we never lose 
sight of those „earthlings‟ (of whatever form) who remain trapped outside and beneath the 
power structures of our age. A burning question, of course, concerns precisely how we now 
construct a juridical order that is responsive, inclusive and possesses the plasticity to 
account for new and complex kinds of rights-holders while simultaneously ensuring full 
juridical responsiveness to the visceral realities facing currently (and traditionally) excluded 
subjectivities.   
